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Theory of Mind (ToM) or mentalizing refers to the ability to attribute mental states (such as 
desires, beliefs or intentions) to oneself or others. ToM has been argued to operate in an 
explicit and an implicit or spontaneous way. In their influential paper Kovács, Téglás and 
Endress (2010) introduced an adapted false belief task – a ball detection task – for the 
measurement of spontaneous ToM. Since then, several studies have successfully used 
versions of this paradigm to investigate spontaneous ToM. This paradigm has however been 
criticized by Phillips and colleagues (2015), who argue that the effects are fully explained by 
timing artifacts in the paradigm, namely differences in timing of the attention check. The main 
objective of the current study is to test this attention-check hypothesis. An additional aim was 
to relate the findings to autism spectrum disorder (ASD) symptomatology in our neurotypical 
sample, as ASD has been linked to deficits in spontaneous mentalizing. We applied an 
adjusted version of the paradigm in which the timings for all conditions are equalized, ruling 
out any potential timing confounds. We found significant main effects of own and agent belief 
on reaction times. Additionally, we found a significant ‘ToM effect’: when participants believe 
the ball is absent, they detect the ball faster if the agent believes the ball would be present 
rather than absent, which refers to the original effect in the paper of Kovács and colleagues 
(2010), taken as evidence for spontaneous ToM and which was contested by Phillips and 
colleagues (2015). Our findings cannot be explained by the attention-check hypothesis. Effects 
could not be associated with ASD symptoms in our neurotypical sample, warranting further 







Social interactions are driven by the ability to attribute mental states (beliefs, intentions, 
desires, and feelings) to oneself and others, which is referred to as Theory of Mind (ToM) or 
mentalizing (Premack & Woodruff, 1978). ToM has been argued to operate in either an explicit 
or implicit/spontaneous mode. Explicit mentalizing refers to a cognitive process during which 
a person is deliberately considering mental states of other’s (Schuwerk, Vuori, & Sodian, 2015; 
Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001). Implicit or spontaneous mentalizing is delineated as a rapid, 
inflexible, cognitive efficient process that operates without being consciously aware of it 
(Clements & Perner, 1994; Kulke, von Duhn, Schneider, & Rakoczy, 2018; Nijhof, Brass, Bardi, 
& Wiersema, 2016; Schneider, Slaughter, & Dux, 2017; Schuwerk et al., 2015). Past research 
has mainly focused on explicit mentalizing as the notion of spontaneous mentalizing has only 
arisen recently, but research on spontaneous mentalizing is rapidly expanding. Investigating 
spontaneous mentalizing may not only provide a better understanding of development of ToM 
(Low & Perner, 2012; Schneider, Slaughter, Becker, & Dux, 2014; Schneider et al., 2017) but 
may also be of major relevance for studying ToM in psychopathology, such as autism spectrum 
disorder (ASD; Senju, 2013b, 2013a). ASD is a neurodevelopmental disorder characterized by 
qualitative impairments in social interactions and communication in daily life, which has been 
explained by a mentalizing deficit: people with ASD have difficulties understanding other 
people’s mental states (Hill & Frith, 2003; Sabbagh, 2004; Schneider, Slaughter, Bayliss, & 
Dux, 2013). However, findings from studies using explicit ToM tasks are not conclusive, as 
children and adults with ASD often pass such tests. It has therefore been reasoned that 
individuals with ASD do not mentalize spontaneously, but may succeed on ToM tasks in which 
they are explicitly asked about the other’s mental state by means of learned cognitive 
compensatory strategies (Frith, 2012). A deficit in spontaneous ToM may explain why 
individuals with ASD keep showing severe mentalizing difficulties in daily social life, which is 
complex and requires fast online implicit mentalizing abilities (Frith, 2012). 
To measure spontaneous mentalizing, a variety of paradigms has been developed to allow 
investigating mental state attribution without requiring participants to explicitly deliberate about 
other people’s mental states (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009). Kovács, Téglás, and Endress (2010) 
introduced an adapted false belief task, in which the participant and agent form a belief about 
the presence of a ball, followed by an outcome phase in which the ball is either present or 
absent. More specifically, participants get to see short movies in which an agent (in their 
version: a Smurf) forms a belief about the location of a ball. The ball can either be behind an 
occluder or roll out of the scene. The agent walks out of the scene and while he is away the 
participant forms a belief about the ball’s location as well. At the end, the agent walks back in 
and the participant has to press a button if he/she thinks the ball is present behind the occluder 
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(in the adaptation for infants no button press is required since eye-tracking is used). However, 
whether or not the ball is behind the occluder (50% of the trials) is independent of what happens 
during the movie. Kovács and her colleagues (2010) employed this paradigm in two different 
samples. First, they ran experiments with neurotypical adults and predicted that they would 
detect the ball faster when they believed the ball would be behind the occluder. More important 
though, they hypothesized that although the belief of the agent is completely irrelevant to the 
task, if participants would spontaneously track the belief of the agent, reaction times should be 
affected by it. They observed that when participants do not expect the ball to be present (P-), 
they detect the ball faster when the agent believes the ball is present (P-A+) rather than absent 
(P-A-), which was taken as evidence for spontaneous mentalizing of the agent’s belief (Kovács 
et al., 2010). The difference in reaction times between these two conditions was in later studies 
referred to as the ‘ToM-index’ (e.g., Deschrijver, Bardi, Wiersema, & Brass, 2016). In a second 
series of experiments, 7 month old infants were tested using a  violation of expectation 
paradigm. Instead of investigating reaction times, looking durations were measured. This was 
indicated by how long the infants looked at the absence of the ball when the participant and/or 
agent believed the ball would be behind the occluder. As in adults, infants as young as 7 
months old, seem to spontaneously track the beliefs of the agent (Kovács et al., 2010).  
Since then, this paradigm, with some adjustments, has been applied in several studies using 
brain imaging and in psychopathological groups (e.g. Bardi, Desmet, Nijhof, Wiersema, & 
Brass, 2017; Deschrijver, Bardi, Wiersema, & Brass, 2016; Nijhof, Bardi, Brass, & Wiersema, 
2018; Nijhof et al., 2016; Nijhof, Brass, & Wiersema, 2017; Phillips et al., 2015). These studies 
revealed three important insights.  
Firstly, in all these studies the ToM-index was found, indicating that the ToM-index is a reliable 
measure that can be replicated in different labs (Deschrijver, et al., 2016; Kovács, Kühn, 
Gergely, Csibra, & Brass, 2014; Kovács et al., 2010; Nijhof, et al., 2017; Phillips et al., 2015). 
Secondly, performance during the implicit version of the task elicits brain activation in core 
ToM regions, such as the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ; Bardi et al., 2017; Kovács et al., 
2014; Nijhof et al., 2018). These results support the validity of the paradigm for measuring 
mentalizing processes (Bardi et al., 2017; Nijhof et al., 2018). Finally, this paradigm has also 
been employed in relation to ASD to investigate the hypothesis that spontaneous mentalizing 
abilities are impaired in people with ASD (Deschrijver et al., 2016; Frith, 2012; Kulke et al., 
2018; Schneider et al., 2013). Deschrijver and colleagues (2016) predicted a smaller ToM-
index in adults with ASD. They found a significant ToM-index, but groups did not significantly 
differ for this effect. However, within the ASD group there was a negative correlation between 
the ToM-index and ASD symptomatology, suggesting less spontaneous mentalizing in adults 
with ASD showing more ASD symptoms. Nijhof, Brass and Wiersema (2017) tested 
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neurotypical adults with higher and lower levels of ASD symptomatology based on scores on 
the short Autism Spectrum Quotient (AQ). As expected, participants with a higher level of ASD 
symptomatology, showed less spontaneous mentalizing as indicated by a smaller ToM-index 
(Nijhof, et al., 2017). Finally, Nijhof and colleagues (2016) found no correlation between the 
ToM-index and ASD symptomatology within a neurotypical sample (Nijhof et al., 2016). While 
these studies provided some evidence for the idea that spontaneous mentalizing is impaired 
in ASD, the results are not unequivocal and the relation between spontaneous ToM and ASD 
symptomatology may be more subtle than assumed (Deschrijver et al., 2016; Nijhof et al., 
2016; Nijhof, et al., 2017). 
While the paradigm has been proven to be a useful tool for studying spontaneous 
mentalizing processes in these studies, the validity of the paradigm as used in adults has been 
questioned by Phillips and colleagues (2015). The authors argue that the initial findings of 
Kovács and colleagues, taken as evidence for spontaneous ToM are driven by inconsistencies 
in the timing of an attention check – the attention-check hypothesis. The crucial aspect in the 
paradigm is that the beliefs formed by the agent are completely irrelevant for the task (detecting 
the ball), but are hypothesized to influence the reaction times as the participant spontaneously 
takes into account the belief of the agent. To ensure that participants pay attention to the video 
and the agent, without providing a rational for the presence of the agent, participants are 
instructed to press a button when the agent leaves the scene (the so called ‘attention check’). 
Phillips and colleagues (2015) claim that the difference between conditions in the timing of the 
attention check, is what explains the results (the so-called attention-check hypothesis). 
According to the authors, this is due to the psychological refractory period (PRP): the shorter 
the time between two judgements is, the slower one is on the second judgement (Phillips et 
al., 2015).  
The attention-check hypothesis has been contested by Nijhof and colleagues (2017). 
They suggested several theoretical and statistical arguments why this explanation is unlikely. 
Among others, they did not observe a cross-over effect in their data which would be expected 
as argued by Phillips and colleagues (2015) based on the timing differences in attention check 
between conditions. They further criticized the proposed underlying mechanism, the PRP, as 
the PRP has been known to only have a short-term effect lasting up to several hundred 
milliseconds, while the shortest interval between the attention check and ball detection was 
more than 3 seconds, which exceeds the reach of a PRP effect (Nijhof et al., 2016). Finally, 
they argued that a negative correlation between the ToM-index and ASD symptom severity in 
adults with ASD, as found by Deschrijver and colleagues (2016), is difficult to reconcile with a 
simple timing explanation. We would like to add to these arguments that neuroimaging findings 
from studies applying this paradigm, showed activation in core mentalizing regions in the brain 
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(e.g., TPJ) also strongly suggest that mentalizing processes are at play and that these effects 
cannot easily be explained by timing artefacts in the paradigm (Bardi et al., 2017; Nijhof et al., 
2018) 
However, none of these arguments form a definitive proof against the attention-check 
hypothesis. Philips and colleagues (2015) manipulated the attention check within the paradigm 
in two different ways to validate their attention-check hypothesis. The results showed that (1) 
if there is no attention check or (2) if the attention check is at the same time in every condition, 
namely when the agent comes back into the scene (and not when he leaves the scene, which 
is the moment the agent forms his belief), the results of Kovács and her colleagues (2010) are 
not replicated. They therefore concluded that the findings in reaction time patterns are driven 
by differences in timing of the attention check and not by the belief of an agent. However, their 
approach is not ideal: it does result in equal timing of the attention check, however it also may 
undermine the purpose of the attention check itself. The attention check is there to ensure that 
the participant pays attention to the agent during a pivotal phase of the movie, namely when 
the agent forms his belief. Omitting the attention check or postponing it to the final stage of the 
movie may result in not paying attention to this pivotal phase of the movie. In order to address 
this concern, we kept the attention check at the same moment as in the original paradigm 
(when the agent leaves the scene) but ensured equal timing for the attention check between 
all conditions. In addition, to completely eliminate any timing issue, we ensured equal timing 
of all events in the paradigm. By equalizing all the timings (how long the agent is in the scene; 
for how long the ball moves; the moment the agent leaves (thus the agent has formed a belief 
and the participant has to press a button); the moment when the agent comes back in and 
when the occluder falls), we rule out any explanation in terms of timing confounds. We 
hypothesized that the reaction time pattern in neurotypical adults will be influenced by both 
own and agent belief. In line with the original findings of Kovács and others (2010) we expected 
to find a significant ToM-index. As an additional aim, we wanted to test whether ToM-index 
scores are related to ASD symptomology as a dimensional trait in our neurotypical sample. 
More specifically, we  explored whether participants scoring higher on ASD symptomology 










Sixty participants (5 male; mean age = 18.82 years; SD = 1.41 years) took part in the 
study. Three participants in total were excluded from further analysis due to an accuracy lower 
than 90%. Data analysis was thus carried out on data of 57 participants (3 male, mean age = 
18.82 years; SD = 1.44 years). All of the participants were students at Ghent University and 
received course credits in return. Informed consent was obtained from all individual 
participants included in the study. This study was approved by the local ethics committee of 
the Faculty of Psychology and Educational Sciences of Ghent University. 
Stimuli and Task 
Implicit mentalizing task. The task was presented on a laptop (15.6 inch) using Presentation 
Software, version 18.1 (Neurobehavioral Systems Inc., San Francisco, CA).  
An adapted version of the implicit Theory of Mind task (Kovács et al., 2010) was used. 
The agent in the original version was a Smurf, while the one used in the adapted version was 
Buzz Lightyear (see also Bardi et al., 2017; Deschrijver et al., 2016; Nijhof et al., 2016). The 
timing properties differ from the version used by Kovàcs and colleagues (2010; see further). 
The storyline remained the same. 
The participants watched short video animations of 720 x 480 pixels. Each video 
consisted of a Belief Formation phase and an Outcome phase. During the movies the beliefs 
of the agent (A) and the participant (P) about the presence of a ball were manipulated (‘+’ if 
the ball was present behind the occluder, ‘-‘ if the ball was absent). The movie always begins 
with Buzz Lightyear entering the scene and placing a ball on the table in front of an occluder. 
The ball then starts moving and rolls behind the occluder. From that moment on, four different 
scenarios, depending on the experimental condition, were possible:  
1. True belief – Positive content condition (Participant+Agent+) 
The ball rolls from behind the occluder halfway to the right and then back behind the 
occluder. The agent walks out of the scene with the (implicit) belief that the ball is behind 
the occluder (A+). In the absence of Buzz, the ball starts rolling halfway to the right and 






2. False belief – Negative content condition (P+A-) 
The ball rolls from behind the occluder halfway to the right and then out of the scene. The 
agent walks out of the scene with the (implicit) belief that the ball is not behind the occluder 
(A-). In the absence of Buzz, the ball rolls back into the scene and halts behind the 
occluder. The result is that the participant now holds a different belief than Buzz (P+).  
3. False belief – Positive content condition (P-A+) 
The ball rolls from behind the occluder halfway to the right and then back behind the 
occluder. The agent walks out of the scene with the (implicit) belief that the ball is behind 
the occluder (A+). In the absence of Buzz, the ball starts rolling halfway to the right and 
then out of the scene. The result is that the participant now holds a different belief than 
Buzz (P-). 
4. True belief – Negative content condition (P-A-) 
The ball rolls from behind the occluder halfway to the right and then out of the scene. The 
agent walks out of the scene with the (implicit) belief that the ball is not behind the occluder 
(A-). In the absence of Buzz, the ball rolls back into the scene and then again out of the 
scene. Resulting in the participant holding the same belief as Buzz (P-). 
In the Outcome phase Buzz walks back into the scene and the occluder falls. This 
reveals whether the ball is or isn’t present behind the occluder. The ball was present in half of 
the trials. The presence of the ball was completely random and independent of the belief 
formation phase. Participants were asked to press a key (‘V’ on the keyboard) when the agent 
left the scene and to press a key when the occluder fell and a ball was present (‘B’ on the 
keyboard). As a result of combining the Belief Formation and Outcome phase, there were eight 
different movies/conditions that were each shown ten times. Therefore the entire experiment 
consisted out of 80 trials, presented in a randomized order in two blocks of 40 trials with a short 
break in between. A blank screen was shown for 2000 ms before every new trial (intertrial 
interval; ITI). Prior to the start of the experiment, four practice trials were presented to the 
participants. They received feedback on their response after each of the respective practice 
trials.    
Whereas in the original task (Kovacs et al., 2010) the timing differs across conditions 
(specifically the moment when the agent left the scene), in our adjusted version, equal timing 
of events during the task was assured (see Figure 1.).  
Every trial consists out of different movie clips and frames that are presented after each 
other as one movie that lasts 12,868 ms using Presentation Software, version 18.1 






Fig 1 Design of the paradigm: the timing is consistent across all conditions. The durations of every movie clip and 
frame are shown in the first row, the second row shows the cumulative durations throughout the trial. Each frame 
is presented 1000 ms to make it possible to time lock certain events (i.e. belief formation Buzz, belief formation 
participant, possible conflict between the two beliefs, outcome). The instructions that were given to the participants 
are indicated in green. Total duration of one trial is 12,868 ms and there was a fixed intertrial interval of 2000 ms.  
Questionnaires 
Two questionnaires were administered to measure ASD symptomatology: the Autism 
Spectrum Quotient (AQ; (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & Clubley, 2001; 
Hoekstra, Bartels, Cath, & Boomsma, 2008) and the Social Responsiveness Scale – Adult 
Version (SRS-A; Constantino & Gruber, 2005). 
The Autism Spectrum Quotient (AQ). The AQ is a self-report screening questionnaire with 
50 items assessing autistic traits in adults. It results in a score on five subscales with 10 items 
each: social skills, attention switching, attention to detail, communication and imagination. 
Each item can be scored on a scale from 1 to 4, later this score was converted to a 
dichotomous outcome (0 or 1).  
The Social Responsiveness Scale – Adult Version (SRS-A). The SRS-A is a self-report 
questionnaire for adults between 18 and 65 years old that measures behavioral dimensions 
that are characteristic to ASD. It consists of  64 items that can be scored on a scale from 1 to 







The study consisted out of two experimental tasks (here we focus on the Buzz Lightyear 
task, the other task will be discussed elsewhere) and three pen-and-paper questionnaires (two 
of which are described above). After participants signed the informed consent, they were asked 
to fill out the SRS-A (Constantino & Gruber, 2005). Subsequently, one of the experimental 
tasks was presented and after completion they filled out a Dutch debriefing form with five 
questions based on the one used by Schneider and colleagues (2013). This was followed by 
the AQ (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001), another experimental task was introduced, also followed 
by a debriefing form and finally the last questionnaire namely the Toronto Alexithymia Scale 
(TAS-20;  Bagby, Parker, & Taylor, 1994) was administered. The order of the experimental 
tasks was counterbalanced and there were no order effects. The entire session took 
approximately one hour. At the end of the session, participants were awarded a course credit 
and to encourage motivation a monetary bonus was given to the top 5 students with the best 
accuracies and reaction times on both experimental tasks.  
Statistical analysis  
Reaction times for detection of the ball were recorded at the end of each trial in which 
the ball was present behind the occluder. Outlier analysis was carried out. All responses more 
than 3 standard deviations above or below the participants overall mean, or less than 100 ms 
were removed from analyses. This resulted in a loss of 46 data points (2.05%) across all 57 
participants. Control analyses revealed that removing the outliers did significantly change any 
of the findings.  
To investigate the effect of own belief and agent’s belief on reaction times, a 2-by-2 
repeated measures ANOVA was carried out with own belief (P+, P-) and agent belief (A+, A-) 
as within-subject factors. We controlled for multiple comparisons by means of a Bonferonni 
correction. In case of violation of the assumption of sphericity Greenhouse-Geisser or Huynh-
Feldt correction was applied. Additionally, we performed a planned comparison for the 
difference between P-A- and P-A+, referred to as the ToM-index, which was taken as evidence 
for spontaneous ToM in the original paper of Kovàcs and colleagues (2010) and was later 
criticized by Philips and colleagues (2015). Finally, Pearson correlations were performed to 
explore the link between the ToM-index and ASD symptomatology as measured with the AQ 
and the SRS-A. If there were missing data for the SRS-A, the median of that scale was used 
as the score on that item (Constantino & Gruber, 2005). Missing items on the AQ were 
estimated using the expectation maximization technique. In the correlational analyses, we 
used scaled scores for the ToM-index ((RT P-A-) – (RT P-A+) / (RT P-A-) + (RT P-A+)), to 
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control for potential confounding effects of differences in overall RT. All statistical analyses 
were carried out with IBM SPSS statistics (SPSS Inc., Chicago, IL, USA).  
Results 
Behavioral Results 
Accuracy. Participants were asked to press a key (‘B’) when the ball was present 
behind the occluder in the outcome phase. Only a few omission errors were made (1.27% of 
trials), hence these were not further analyzed. In 8.37% of the trials they pressed the key when 
the ball was not present behind the occluder (i.e. ‘false alarms’). There is no effect of condition 
on the number of false alarms (F (3,168) = 1.63, p = 0.19, 𝜼𝒑
²  = 0.03; sphericity assumed).  
Reaction time. The mean reaction time to the ball was 351 ms (SD = 8.85 ms; 95% CI 














Fig 2 Mean reaction times (ms) per condition. 
 
To investigate the effect of own belief and agent’s belief on reaction times, a 2x2 
repeated measures ANOVA was performed. A significant main effect of own belief (F(1,56) = 
59.09, p < 0.001, 𝜂𝑝
²  = 0.51)  and agent belief (F(1,56) = 6.50, p = 0.01, 𝜂𝑝
²  = 0.10) was found. 
There was no significant interaction effect of own belief x agent belief (F(1,56) = 0.62, p = 0.44, 
𝜂𝑝
²  = 0.01). Taking a closer look at the main effect of own belief, we observed that participants 
respond 29.59 ms faster (SD = 3.85, 95% CI = [-37.29, -21,87], p < 0.001) to the presence of 
the ball in the conditions were the participants hold the belief that the ball would be present 
(P+ conditions) compared to the conditions were the participants belief the ball would be 
absent (P- conditions). The main effect of agent belief indicates that the belief of the agent 
about the presence or absence of the ball, also influences how fast the participant detects the 
ball. Participants are 9.14 ms faster (SD = 3.58, 95% CI [-16.32, -1.96], p = 0.01) in the 
conditions were the agent holds the belief that the ball would be present (A+ conditions) 
compared to the conditions were the agent had the opposite belief (A- conditions).  
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The planned comparison between P-A- and P-A+ (the ToM-index) shows that 
participants were significantly slower in the P-A- condition compared to the P-A+ condition (p 
= 0.03; 95% CI = [1.38, 22.80]). As this was a planned comparison based on the findings of 
others (Deschrijver et al., 2016; Kovàcs et al., 2010; Nijhof et al., 2016), no Bonferroni 
correction was applied. Table 1 shows all comparison between conditions, with Bonferroni 
correction for the other comparisons (p-value of 0.0083 (0.05/6)). All conditions differ 
significantly, even after Bonferroni correction, from each other with the exception of P+A+ and 
P+A-.  
Table 1. Overview of the statistical comparisons between the four conditions 
Condition 1 Condition 2 Mean Diff. (1-2) Std. Error 95% CI p-value 
P-A- P-A+ 12.09 5.35 1.38 – 22.80 0.028* 
 P+A- 32.53 6.27 19.97 – 45.09 <0.001* 
 P+A+ 38.72 4.75 29.21 – 48.23 <0.001* 
P-A+ P+A- 20.45 5.72 8.98 – 31.91 0.001* 
 P+A+ 26.64 4.31 18.00 – 35.27 <0.001* 
P+A- P+A+ 6.19 5.04 -3.90 – 16.28 0.224 
Note. P = Participant, A = Agent, + = belief ball is present, - = belief ball is absent. The colored 
row indicates the planned comparison (P-A- vs. P-A+). *Indicates a significant effect.  
Questionnaires 
All 57 participants filled out both questionnaires. For the SRS-A the scores ranged 
between 16 and 109 with a mean score of 41.39 (SD = 16.23). There was 0.003% missing 
data (10 of 3420 items). The scores on the AQ varied between 8 and 31 with a mean score of 
15.14 (SD = 5.43). There was 0.003% missing data (9 of 2850 items).  As expected these two 
questionnaires are strongly correlated (r = 0.67, p < 0.001). However, neither the SRS-A nor 
the AQ correlated significantly with the ToM-index (r = -0.08, p = 0.54 for the SRS-A and r = -
0.03, p = 0.84 for the AQ).  
Discussion 
Kovács and colleagues (2010) developed a ball detection paradigm to measure 
spontaneous mentalizing. They observed that when participants do not expect the ball to be 
present (P-), they detect the ball faster when the agent believes the ball is present (A+) rather 
than absent (A-), which they took as evidence for spontaneous mentalizing (Kovács et al., 
2010). After that several studies applied this paradigm and were able to replicate this finding 
(Bardi et al., 2017; Deschrijver et al., 2016; Nijhof, et al., 2017). However, Phillips and 
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colleagues (2015) argued that the observed effects are possibly not the result of mentalizing 
abilities but rather are the outcome of timing artifacts within the paradigm, more precisely 
differences in timing between conditions for the attention check, referred to as the attention-
check hypothesis. The objective of the current study was to investigate if the ToM-effect would 
still be present when all timings would be equalized, and thus eliminating any potential timing 
artifact. The ToM-index was observed, hence this effect cannot be explained by a timing 
confound.   
We found that the participants reactions were influenced by both their own and the 
agent’s belief as reflected in significant main effects of own belief and agent belief on reaction 
times.  This shows that the participant’s reaction times are not only affected by their own belief, 
but also by the belief that is attributed to an agent. As the original work of Kovács and 
colleagues (2010), we focused on the difference between P-A+ and P-A- conditions, which 
referred to as the ToM-index, and was later contested by Phillips and colleagues (2015). We 
performed a planned comparison for this effect. In line with previous work, we found a 
significant ToM-index: participants were significantly faster in the condition where the agent 
believes the ball will be present (P-A+), compared to the condition where the agent believes 
the ball is absent while the participant believes the ball would be absent (P-A). This implies 
that even if they believe the ball will be absent, they spontaneously take the belief of the agent 
into account, enabling them to respond faster to the presence of the ball. These findings 
indicate that the attention-check hypothesis of Phillips and his colleagues (2015) do not explain 
the results that are found with this paradigm. They argued that the effects were due to a shorter 
delay between the attention check key press and the ball detection response in the P+A+ and 
P-A- conditions (Phillips, et al., 2015). Differences in reaction time are then the result of the 
psychological refractory period. However, the current study refutes this as all possible timing 
artifacts are removed from the paradigm, thus the found effects cannot be explained by the 
attention-check hypothesis.  
Interestingly, we did not only observe a significant ToM-index, also a main effect of  
agent belief was found. This effect was hypothesized but not observed in the original study of 
Kovács and colleagues (2010). Indicating that our findings provide even stronger support for 
spontaneous mentalizing, compared to only the ToM-index. Most studies focused specifically 
on the ToM-index, however a main effect of the other agent’s belief has been reported in 
another study using the paradigm with ‘confounded’ timing (Nijhof et al., 2017) as well, hence 
we can only speculate about the reasons for our finding. It may be that the effect of the agent’s 
belief on ball detection is (somewhat) stronger when oneself does not have a representation 
of the ball (P-A- vs P-A+) than when there already exists a representation of the ball (P+A- vs 
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P+A+), which may explain the inconsistency across studies. Future well-powered studies are 
needed to further address this issue.  
Phillips and his colleagues (2015) highlighted that we need to get a better 
understanding of (spontaneous) mentalizing processes, but that this requires valid paradigms 
to test these aspects of social cognition. The current study demonstrates that the effects found 
with the paradigm of Kovács and colleagues (2010) are not solely due to timing confounds. 
Several studies (e.g. Bardi et al., 2017; Deschrijver et al., 2016; Nijhof et al., 2016, 2017) 
successfully employed this paradigm and contested the attention-check hypothesis with 
theoretical and statistical arguments. Nevertheless, to completely rule out the attention-check 
hypothesis the timing difference between conditions needs to be eliminated. Phillips and 
colleagues (2015) made an attempt by putting the attention check at the moment when the 
agent comes back in the scene (same in every condition) and by removing the attention check. 
Nevertheless, these approaches ignore the true purpose of the attention check, namely making 
sure that participants pay attention to the agent at the crucial moment when he forms a belief 
about the location of the ball, without the participant being aware of this purpose.      
As of yet no study had assured fully equal timing between events in this paradigm (while 
also taking the purpose of the attention check into account), which is needed to fully rule out 
any potential timing confounds. The current study provides empirical evidence because here 
we show that the ToM-index cannot be explained in terms of differences in timing of events or 
refractory period. This conclusion is in accordance with recent fMRI findings indicating that 
core ToM regions, such as the TPJ and the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), are activated 
when using the spontaneous ToM task (Bardi et al., 2017; Nijhof et al., 2018). This strengthens 
the conclusion that findings cannot solely be attributed to confounds but do reflect spontaneous 
mentalizing processes.  
To assure that belief attribution was spontaneous and not explicit, participants were 
asked to fill out a debriefing form (see also, Schneider et al., 2013). This debriefing procedure 
revealed that participants were not consciously tracking the belief of the agent. Participants 
were also asked if they were paying attention to the movements of the ball. This is important 
to take into account because if the participants do not pay attention to the movements of the 
ball, and thus are not tracking its location, they cannot attribute a belief about its location to 
another person. Nine of the participants reported that they only focused on the outcome (the 
falling of the green occluder) and that they did not track the movements of the ball. Excluding 
these nine participants did not change the effects. Exploratory analyses on this very small 
sample suggest that when there is no attention to the ball, the reaction times only differ 
between the P+ and P- conditions, and that no agent effect, nor the ToM-index is observed. 
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Our sample is too small to draw any strong conclusions, but this notion may be of importance 
for future studies. Two things can be considered. First, it indicates the importance of the 
attention check. Second, future research should be aware of this issue and include a debriefing 
to control if participants actually paid attention to the object (here a ball). This may be important 
to assure that results and group differences in future studies may not be due to differences in 
paying attention to the ball.  
As an additional aim of our study, we investigated the relation between ASD 
symptomatology as a dimensional trait in a neurotypical population and spontaneous ToM, but 
no correlation was found. This finding is in line with a recent study by Nijhof and colleagues 
(2016) and can be due to restricted variance in ASD symptomatology in our neurotypical 
sample. In a study with neurotypical adults with higher or lower levels on ASD symptomatology 
(a priori selected based on scores on the short AQ) a group difference was found: 
Neurotypicals with lower levels of ASD symptomatology show a significant ToM-index, while 
this was absent in the group with higher levels of ASD symptoms (Nijhof et al., 2017). 
Deschrijver and colleagues (2015) also found a correlation between ASD symptomatology and 
spontaneous ToM (the ToM-index), however only in their ASD sample. Hence, overall findings 
do suggest a negative association between ASD symptoms and spontaneous mentalizing, 
especially when ASD symptoms are more severe but more research is definitely warranted, 
as findings are not conclusive.  
In summary, Phillips and colleagues (2015) argued that the found effects with the 
paradigm developed by Kovács and her colleagues (2010) were due to timing artifacts caused 
by the psychological refractory period and that therefore the paradigm is not suited to measure 
spontaneous mentalizing. Here, we showed that when keeping the purpose of the attention 
check intact and equalizing the timings of all events across conditions, we found significant 
effects of the agent’s belief on ball detection speed and could replicate the initial finding of 
Kovács et and colleagues (2010); we observed a significant ToM-index. Our results refute the 
attention-check hypothesis and suggest that we spontaneously track other agents’ beliefs 
within this paradigm. No association with ASD symptoms in our neurotypical sample was 
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